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CASE COMMENTS

In application, lanniello is the same as the earlier cases of Black
and Groban, which denied a right to counsel and emphasized the right
against self-incrimination as the witness' only protection. All three
cases presuppose knowledge on the part of the witness which may, in
fact, be lacking. Even though most witnesses may actually know of
their privilege against self-incrimination, it seems unlikely that many
will have knowledge of the actual procedures to follow in invoking
that privilege and in forcing the question into open court.
D. WHITNEY THORNTON, II

DISINHERITANCE AND THE ANTI-LAPSE STATUTE
When a legatee predeceases the testator the legacy is said to "lapse"
and pass into the residuary.] Anti-lapse statutes have been enacted to
prevent the passage of such legacies into the residuary, and to effect
the probable intention of the testator had he thought of the possibility
of surviving the legatee. 2 Generally, these statutes, by preventing the
legacy from passing into the residuary, provide that property which
would have passed into the residuary passes instead to the lineal
descendants of the deceased legatee. 3 A problem arises, however, when
2T. ATKINSON, WILLS, § 140, at 777 (2d ed. 1953); 6 PAGE, WILLS, § 50.io, at
77 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1962). It is possible that the lapsing legacy will itself be
the residuary, in which case the lapsed residuary passes by intestate distribution.
2E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-176 (1958); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.273 (1964);
N.Y. EPTL § 3-3.3 (McKinney 1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.52 (Baldwin
1964). See In re Estate of Pew, io Cal. App. 41, 50 P.2d io45 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935);
In re Estate of Braun, 256 Iowa 55, 126 N.V.2d 318 (1964); Gianoli v. Gabaccia,
82 Nev. 108, 412 P.2d 439 (1966); In re Force's Estate, 23 N.J. Misc. 141, 42 A.2d
302 (Orphans' Ct. 1945); In re Howes' Estate, 35 Misc. 2d 109, 229 N.Y.S.2d 469
(Stir. Ct. 1962); In re Estate of Burn, 78 S.D. 223, 1oo N.W.2d 399 (196o).
This statutory provision was enacted to avoid the lapse of bequests to
certain near relatives of a testator and the purpose of the statute was to
fulfill an unexpressed intention of the testator by providing a disposition
of a legacy in circumstances where the testator's failure to provide a disposition could be regarded as an oversight on his part .... The statute was
not intended either to establish a public policy or to substitute a legislative
intent for a testamentary intent and, accordingly, the statute is without
application if it is evident from a will that the failure to provide for
the passing of a legacy in conformity with the statute in not an oversight
and the statutory disposition would not be in harmony with the testator's
testamentary purpose ....
In re Howes' Estate, 35 Misc. 2d lo9, 229 N.Y.S.2d 469, 470 (Sur. Ct. 1962 ) .
3CAL. PROB. CODE § 92 (West 1956); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 353 (1957); N.J.
Rrv. STAT. § 3 A: 3 -i 3 (1951).
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the application of the anti-lapse statute defeats the apparent intention
of the testator to disinherit a lineal descendant or heir of the legatee.
In Bruner v. First National Bank,4 the testatrix expressly disinherited certain parties, stating:
I give and bequeath my son, Doc Mack, my daughter, Bertha
Quiver, my grandsons Floyd Mack and Raymond B. Mack, the
sum of Ten Dollars ($1o.oo) each. I intentionally make no
other provision for the above named persons. I am expressly
disinheriting all of the above persons except ... my daughter
Dressie Mack Reynolds .... 5
The remainder of the estate was left by the residuary clause to Dressie
Mack Reynolds. The testatrix made no provision for the contingency
of her daughter predeceasing her, and one year before testatrix's
death, her daughter died. The daughter's sole heir was her son,
Raymond B. Mack, who was one of the persons expressly disinherited
in testatrix's will. The testatrix did nothing to change her will, and
upon her death, Raymond B. Mack contended that the Oregon antilapse statute0 should be applied by the court to prevent the legacy
to his mother from lapsing. The other disinherited parties, however,
contended that the testatrix manifested a contrary intention in her
will when she expressly disinherited Raymond, and that application
of the anti-lapse statute would be contrary to that apparent intent.
If the statute were applied, Raymond B. Mack would take the entire
estate, and if it were not applied, the testatrix's estate would pass
by the statute of descent and distribution as though the testatrix had
7
died intestate.
The Supreme Court of Oregon determined that the anti-lapse
statute should be applied to the residuary clause, reasoning that by
expressly disinheriting certain parties, the testatrix intended only to
prevent them from claiming a portion of her estate under the preOre. -, 443 P.2d 645 (1968).
5Id. at 645-46 (emphasis added).
8
The Oregon anti-lapse statute is as follows:
When any estate is devised to any child, grandchild or other relative of
the testator, and such devisee dies before the testator, leaving lineal descendants, such descendants shall take the estate, real and personal as such
devisee would have done if he had survived the testator.
ORE. REv. STAT. § 114.-240 (1965).
There are several kinds of anti-lapse statutes. They differ as to the type of
legatee which comes under the influence of the statute and who is susbstituted in
his place, but these differences are irrelevant for purposes of the discussion here.
See 6 PAGE, WILLS, § 50.10 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1962).
7Since the testaror's residuary clause lapses if the anti-lapse statute does not
apply, it is as if the testator had died intestate. The Oregon statutes of descent
and distribution are ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 111.020-.030 (1957).
4-
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termitted heirs statute.8 While the disinheritance prevented Raymond
B. Mack from claiming under the pretermitted heirs staute, it did
not preclude him from claiming under the anti-lapse statute. If the
testatrix intended to disinherit completely the grandson, she would
have taken steps to accomplish this intention after her daughter had
died.0
The judicial function in construing a will is to ascertain and give
effect to the probable intention of the testator as gleaned from a
reading of his will in light of all surrounding facts and circumstances. 10 Accordingly, the anti-lapse statute is not mandatory and it
will not be applied where it will defeat the manifest intention of the
testator." However, unless the testator actually provides substitutes
for his legatees, it is exceedingly difficult to disinherit a specific party
and prevent the operation of the anti-lapse statute. The primary
reason for this is that courts place the burden of proof upon the party
contending that the anti-lapse statute should not be applied, 12 and
'A "pretermitted heirs" statute provides that a child omitted from his parent's
will may take his intestate share of the parent's estate, unless it appears that the
omission is intentional or he is otherwise provided for. ORE. Rrv. STAT. § 114.250
(1965) concerning pretermitted heirs is as follows:
If any person makes his will and dies, leaving a child or children, or, in
case of their death, descendants of such child or children, not named or
provided for in such will, although born after the making of such will or
the death of the testator, every such testator, so far as regards such child
or children or their descendants, not provided for, shall be deemed to die
intestate; and such child or children, or their decendants, shall be entitled
to such proportion of the estate of the testator, real and personal, as if
he had died intestate; and the same shall be assigned to them, and all the
other heirs, devisees and legatees shall refund their proportional part.
(emphasis added).
It should be noted that the testatrix had six unmentioned grandchildren, a
fact which the court seemingly ignored. If the testatrix were trying to keep
relatives from claiming under the pretermitted heirs statute, then it would seem
she would have named all her relatives. Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 1,
Bruner v. First Nat'l Bank, - Ore. -, 443 P.2d 645 (1968).
"443 P.2d at 646-47.
"0 In re Estate of Daley, 6 Ariz. App. 443, 433 P.2d 296 (1967); In re Will of
Faber, 259 Iowa 1, 141 N.W.2d 554 (1966); In re Barnum's Will, 53 Misc. 2d 413, 278
N.Y.S.2d 934 (Sur. Ct. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 289 N.Y.S.2d. 25 (Sup. Ct.
1968); Ashley v. Volz, 218 Tenn. 42o, 404 S.W.2d 239 (1966).
"Brewer v. Curtis, 3o Del. (7 Boyce) 503, io8 A. 673 (1920); Gianoli v. Gabaccia,
82 Nev. 108, 412 P.2d 439 (1966); Day v. Brooks, 39 Ohio Op. ad 441, 224 N.E.2d
557 (P. Ct. 1967); Kunkel v. Kunkel, 267 Pa. 163, 11o A. 73 (192o)2See Brewer v. Curtis, 3o Del. (7 Boyce) 5o3, io8 A. 673 (1920); In re Estate
of Braun, 256 Iowa 55, 126 N.W.2d 318 (1964); Vance v. Johnson, 171 Md. 435,
188 A. 805 (1937); Henney v. Ertl, 7 N.J. Super. 401, 71 A.2d 546 (Ch. 1950); Detzel
v. Nieberding, 36 Ohio Op. 2d 358, 219 N.E.2d 327 (P- Ct. 1966).
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13
the failure to meet this burden results in the operation of the statute.
Moreover, it is exceedingly difficult to prevent the anti-lapse statute
from applying when unforeseen circumstances occur after the execution of a will and the testator never thought of the contingency confronting the court. In this situation courts are reluctant to admit
parol evidence as to the testator's probable intent 14 and they resort
to rules of construction. 15 In some jurisdictions these rules have been
codified. '1 The utilization of these rules and of presumptions makes
the burden of proof more difficult for the party contending that the
anti-lapse statute should not apply. For instance, the courts favor
a construction of any will which leaves no intestacy; i.e., there is
a presumption against intestacy. 17 Furthermore, the testator is pre-

'"Brewer v. Curtis, So Del. (7 Boyce) 503, io8 A. 673 (1920); Henney v. Ertl,
7 NJ. Super. 401, 71 A.2d 546 (Ch. 195o); In re Estate of Burn, 78 S.D. 223, 100
N.W.2d 399 (196o); Detzel v. Nieberding, 36 Ohio Op. 2d 358, 29 N.E.2d 327
(P. Ct. 1966).
"4In re Estate of Winslow, 259 Iowa 1316, 147 N.W.2d 814 (1967); In re Estate
of Martin, 199 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 1967); In re Estate of Fowler, 338 S.V.2d 44 (Mo.
196o); See In re Estate of Hoffman, 53 N.J. Super. 396, 147 A.2d 545 (App. Div.
1965).

In the contruction of a will, the type of evidence admissable in discovering
the testator's intent is decisive. Extrinsic evidence is not permitted in the unambiguous will. If the will is ambiguous, however, the courts must determine whether the
ambiguity is latent or patent. Latent ambiguities arise from outside circumstances
and courts allow extrinsic evidence. Patent ambiguities arise from a death of
clarity within the will. Opinion is not uniform concerning the admissability of
extrinsic evidence here. But even courts which allow extrinsic evidence in patent
ambiguity situations limit this evidence to the determination of surrounding
circumstances, and do not allow parol evidence to determine the testator's probable
intent. Also, courts allowing extrinsic evidence in patent situations often circumvent
this by declaring the will unambiguous. See Weir v. Leafgreen, 26 Ill. 2d 4o6, 186
N.E.2d 293 (1962); In re Estate of Hoffman, 53 N.J. Super. 396; 147 A.2d 545
(App. Div. 1965).

n5Interpretation is the process of discovering, from permissible data, the
meaning or intention of the testator as expressed in his will. If interpretation discloses a clear and full intention on the part of the testator, further
inquiry is not necessary. On the other hand, courts resort to the process
of construction if the discovered intention is partial or ambiguous and
therefore inconclusive. In pursuing this process a court is aided by certain
rules of construction or presumptions. In applying these rules the court
is seeking to assign intention to the words used by the testator, and is not
seeking the testator's action intention, for it has already failed to find this.
20 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1o4 (1963).
"E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 102, 103 (West 1956); N.Y. EPTL § 9-1.3 (McKinney
1967).
Tfadenhauer v. Hecht, 159 Cal. App. 2d 686, 324 P.2d 693 (Dist. Ct. App.
1958); Detzel v. Nieberding, 36 Ohio Op. 2d 358, 219 N.E.2d 327 (P. Ct. 1966);
Snyder's Estate v. Denit, 195 Md. 81, 72 A.2d 757 (1950).
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sumed to know the law and, consequently, to know that the anti-lapse
statute will be applied if no substitute legatees are named.' 8
Judicial reluctance not to apply the anti-lapse statute in cases of
general disinheritance is exemplified by Larwill's Executors v. Ewing.19
There the testator made a specific legacy of $5o,ooo to his daughter,
Elizabeth L. Miller, and in a subsequent codicil he disinherited all
persons not specifically mentioned in his will: "This omission is not
accidental or inadvertent or from any unkind feelings on my part,
but deliberate and determined, and for reasons which seem to me
good and sufficient." 20 Elizabeth L. Miller predeceased the testator,
but he did not revoke the legacy to her. Elizabeth's daughter, who
was not mentioned in the testator's will, contended that she should
take her mother's legacy by way of the anti-lapse statute. The court,
in applying the statute, utilized the presumption that the testator
knew of the anti-lapse statute and of its effect when he made the
legacy to Elizabeth. "Stability and consistency of adjudication require
the conclusive presumption that the gift was made with knowledge
2
of the statute and its effect." 1
As Larwill's Executive illustrates, in those cases involving a general disinheritance, the testator has manifested no specific intent to
disinherit any particular person, and courts apply rules of construction.
In cases involving a specific disinheritance, even though the testator
has manifested a specific intent to disinherit a particular person,
courts still employ these rules. In In re Carleton's Will, 22 a testatrix
made a specific legacy of $5,ooo to her son, Alexander Carleton. In
another clause of the will, a specific legacy of $iooo was made to each
of her grandchildren. This clause was subsequently modified by a
codicil which specifically excluded two of the grandchildren by name.
One of the excluded grandchildren was Horace M. Carleton, son of
Alexander Carleton. The testatrix stated in the codicil: "For reasons
best known to myself and my grandson Horace M. Carleton, I feel
'23
that I should not remember him in any financial way in my Will.
Alexander Carleton predeceased testatrix, and she never revoked the
legacy to him. Upon her death Horace M. Carleton contended that
"In re Estate of Braun, 256 Iowa 55, 126 N.W.2d 318 (1964); Vance v. Johnson,
171 Md. 435, 188 A. 805 (1937); In re Force's Estate, 23 N.J. Misc. 141, 42 A.2d 302
(Orphans' Ct. 1945); Schneider v. Dorr, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 391, 21o N.E.2d 311 (P.
Ct. 1965).
"73 Ohio St. 177, 76 N.E. 503 (1905).
"Id. at 5o4.
mid.
123 Misc. 2d 677, 151 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Sur. Ct. 1956).
20
1d. at 339-40.
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the anti-lapse statute should be applied and that he, as a lineal descendant of his father, should take his proportional share of that
legacy. Notwithstanding the specific disinheritance, the court applied
the anti-lapse statute by reasoning that the specific disinheritance in
the codicil related only to the clause in the will which granted Horace
the iooo, and not to the will in its entirety.2 4
Perhaps a specific disinheritance should be treated differently by
courts than a general disinheritance. A specific disinheritance clearly
manifests an intent to exclude a lineal descendant of the legatee. If
the courts truly wish to effectuate the intent of the testator, they should
consider parol evidence and the circumstances surrounding the disinheritance of the specific person. Among the factors which might be
considered are: whether the testator actually had ill feelings toward
the disinherited person; whether the testator wished to preclude the
disinherited person from claiming under a pretermitted heirs statute;
and whether the testator thought that by providing for the disinherited person's parents, he had, in effect, provided for the disinherited
person.
If the courts wish to persist in mechanically applying rules of
construction to both specific and general disinheritances, they should
at least shift the burden of proof as to whether the anti-lapse statute
is to be applied to the disinherited person or persons. Where a legatee
predeceases a testator and the inquiry is whether the anti-lapse statute
should be applied, there is usually no general or specific disinheritance.
The burden of proof in this instance is properly placed upon the
party contending that the anti-lapse statute should not be applied.
There is nothing on the face of the will to indicate that the statute
should not be applied. However, a different situation exists when
in addition to a legatee predeceasing the testator, a particular person
or class has been disinherited. In this instance the will on its face
seems to indicate that it was the testator's intention that the particular
person or class not be a beneficiary. The burden of proof in this
situation should be placed on the person contending that the antilapse statute does apply.
There are decisions in which the anti-lapse statute has not been
applied. The intent of the testatrix, rather than rules of construction,
was determined to be crucial in In re McKeon's Estate.25 A testatrix
revoked a bequest in a codicil by stating, "I hereby annul and revoke
MId. at 341.
Z182 Misc. 906, 46 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sur. Ct. 1944); accord, Fischer v. Mills, 248
Iowa i3ig, 85 N.W.2d 533 (1957).
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the conditional bequest and legacy of One hundred (,ioo) Dollars
to my niece, Catherine Doughty Smith .... and I hereby declare and
direct that my said niece shall receive no part of my estate."26 The
testatrix died without having changed a legacy to the niece's deceased
mother. The niece was not permitted to take her mother's legacy by
operation of the anti-lapse statute. The court determined that the
testatrix clearly expressed her intent in the codicil that the niece was
27
to take no part of her estate.
In cases where the testator makes his legacy contingent on the
survival of the legatee, the majority rule is that the anti-lapse statute
should not be applied. 2s Such legacies are determined to be conditional gifts; the condition having failed, the gift fails.
Ironically, the very rules which the courts develop to aid in the
construction of the will in order to ascertain the testator's intention
hinder their actual determination. In situations where unforeseen circumstances occur after the execution of a will, courts are seemingly
more interested in stability and consistency of adjudication through
applying artificial rules of construction than in the testator's probable
intention had he thought of the contingency facing the court. By the
weight of authority, Bruner reaches the only permissable result: the
anti-lapse statute applies unless the will specifically and irrefutably
states otherwise. New Jersey has taken an enlightened approach in
determining what the testator's probable intention would have been
in such situations by liberally admitting parol evidence and considering the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, as
well as circumstances from that time until the testator's death: 29
Since the goal is the ascertainment of the testator's probable intent in [a] ... will construction case, precedents involving the construction of other wills have no great force. [Citations omitted]. Similarly, canons of construction which are
2"46 N.Y.S.2d at 351 (court's emphasis).
-rd.
SBrewer v. Curtis, 3o Del. (7 Boyce) 503, io8 A. 673 (1920); Vollmer v. McGowan, 409 Ill. 306, 99 N.E.2d 337 (1951); Hay v. Dole, 119 Me. 421, 111 A. 713
(1920); In re Robinson's Will, 37 Misc. 2d 546, 236 N.Y.S.2d 293 (Sur. Ct. 1963);
Day v. Brooks, 39 Ohio Op. 2d 441, 224 N.E.2d 557 (P. Ct. 1967); Kunkel v. Kunkel,
267 Pa. 163, 11o A. 73 (1920). But cf. In re Will of LeRoy, 54 Misc. 2d 33, 281
N.Y.S.2d 287 (Sur. Ct. 1967); Detzel v. Nieberding, 7 Ohio Misc. 262, 219 N.E.2d
327 (1966).
The survival condition is typically worded "if A survives me" or "if living
at the time of my decease."
!In re Cook, 44 N.J. 1, 206 A.2d 865 (1965). Fidelity Union Trust Co. v.
Robert, 36 N.J. 561, 178 A.2d 185 (1962).

